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1. Executive Summary 
  The thriving of the global economy depends on the integrity of financial markets and the 
confidence of investors. External audits, as trusted monitoring mechanism, play a vital role in 
restoring the confidence of investors in financial information provided by public-trade entities. 
However, the recent financial institutions failures after issuance of unqualified audit opinions 
have cast doubt in the value of external audits. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the role of 
external audits in financial institutions and find the answer to the questions: to what extent are 
auditors responsible for failing to identify fraudulent financial statement and do financial 
standards contribute to audit failure? Lehman case analysis is used. The results indicate that 
Ernst and Young failure to discover potential fraudulent activity was partly contributed by the 
ambiguity in the accounting standards which may have in part biased the auditors’ judgment and 
decision process. 
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2. Introduction 
 The thriving of the global economy depends on the integrity of financial markets and the 
confidence of investors. Transparency, accountability and fair business transactions serve as key 
elements in maintaining a healthy financial system hence a strong global economy. However, in a 
highly competitive business environment where management is expected to make decisions that 
create wealth for the shareholders, meet market expectations and is evaluated based on business 
performance may not necessary create a conductive environment that promote these key elements. 
 Given the significance of maintaining the integrity of financial markets and the 
confidence of investors, it is therefore vital for regulators (i.e. US Financial Accounting Standard 
Board (FASB), Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), Credit Rating Agencies (CRA) 
together with external auditors) to serve as trusted “gatekeepers” to ensure that investors are 
provided with financial information that is both reliable and relevant for investment decision 
making (Coffee 2006).  
 For instance, FASB is looked upon to choose and implement financial policies and 
standards used in evaluation of financial information. SEC is expected to provide effective 
monitoring and rules enforcement for public traded companies (Coffee 2006; Armour et al 2011). 
CRAs are required to give opinion about the credit worthiness of securities issuers and their 
financial responsibilities to mitigate risk and losses associated with defaults (SEC credit rating 
report 2003). And external auditors are obligated to evaluate business entities and provide a 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are a true reflection of the entities’ financial 
health and that the statements are compliant with the appropriate financial reporting framework 
i.e. US (GAAP)/IFRS (Stuart 2012). 
 Effectiveness of regulators, CRA and external auditors in their respective roles is 
therefore essential for creating and maintaining an environment that promotes transparency, 
accountability, and fair business transactions. This in turn enhances the confidence of investors 
and maintains the integrity of the financial market. However, the unexpected financial institutions 
failures after issuance of unqualified opinions during the financial crisis of 2007-2008 cast doubt 
on the ability and credibility of trusted gatekeepers. This paper focuses on the value of external 
audits, the challenges faced by audit professionals and factors that influence audit quality. 
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2.1 Literature review 
 Unexpected business corporation failures and discovery of fraudulent financial reporting 
after issuance of unqualified opinions have and continue to spark great interest among academic 
scholars and business researchers. Different research studies have been conducted in a quest to 
investigate and understand the reason behind audit failures. Results in some of these studies 
indicate that different factors influence the level of audit quality. 
 Audit quality can be defined as a function of i) the likelihood of an auditor discovering a 
financial misstatement and ii) the decision the auditor takes in connection with the discovery of 
the financial misstatement( DeAngelo 1981). The likelihood that an auditor will discover a 
financial misstatement and that he or she will take the appropriate action is closely linked with 
the auditor’s competence and independence (DeAngelo 1981). An auditor’s competence in this 
case means his or her knowledge, experience and effort exacted in any given audit engagement. 
The auditor independence is related to his or her relationship with a given client and how this 
affects his or her ability to conduct an audit engagement (DeAngelo 1981; Watts and Zimmerman 
1981).  
 Previous research studies suggest that the audit risk model is flawed because of the 
business aspect of the accounting firms (Sikka et al. 2009). Auditors are usually hired by the firm 
they audit and therefore they may have financial incentives to remain in the client’s favor 
(DeAngelo 1981; Magee and Tseng 1990; Sikka et al. 2009). Consistence with this argument, 
some experimental studies document that a high perception of client loss (Farmer et al 1987; 
Blay 2005), fee pressure i.e. audit firm in response to fees pressure are likely to reduce audit 
budgeted hours, emphasis on efficiency which may lead to auditor’s reliance on internal controls 
in regardless of the client’s risk profile (Houston 1999; Grambling 1999), and client retention 
(Chang and Hwang 2003) can impair auditors judgment hence the level of audit quality.  
  The presence of these incentives in addition to non-financial pressures are believed to 
unintentionally influence auditors to gather and evaluate evidence in align with their clients 
interest thus resulting to biased judgment and decisions (Moore et al. 2002; King 2001). However, 
King (2001) points out that auditors work within a team setting and are strongly affiliated with 
audit firms and professional organizations hence this affiliation mitigates the effects of self-
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interest and unconscious biases. In addition, auditors because of their role as “repeated players” 
have a reputation to protect hence have strong incentives to provide high quality audits 
(DeAngelo 1981; Coffee 2006). However, this  may vary  as some researches document that 
auditors with higher perception of risks associated with potential litigation are likely to provide 
higher quality audits (Chang and Hwang 2003; Palmrose 1988; Johnstone et al. 2001)  indicating 
that lower perception of risks associated with potential litigation may lead to low quality audits.  
  Kofman and Lawerree (1993) suggest that external and internal auditors play 
complementary roles. Internal auditors because of their position in the firm are able to gather 
information and provide other services at a low cost than the external auditors. However, because 
of the internal auditors close association with the firm in relation to employment; they are more 
likely to collude with management to misrepresent financial reports. External auditors on the 
other hand because of their independent position are less likely to collude with management 
hence more likely to provide high quality audits 
 Kofman and Lawerree (1993) further argue that if an accounting firm is hired by the 
management to do auditing and consulting services, the firm even though it may exist as a 
separate legal entity may be seen as internal auditor. This emphasizes the importance of 
independence and the influence that the lack of independence may have on auditor’s judgment 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Consistence with Kofman and Lawerree (1993), Carcello and Neal 
(2000) provide empirical evidence in supporting this view in relationship with a firm’s audit 
committee.  
 Carcello and Neal (2000) examined the relationship between the percentage of audit 
committee members who are affiliated to the firm and the likehood that the auditor will issue a 
going-concern-modified report to firms experiencing financial distress. Because such affiliated 
members have strong ties with the firm, their independence is likely to be impaired hence may 
ineffectively monitor the firm, giving rise to low quality audits.  Measuring effectiveness by the 
likehood of the firm’s auditor issue a going concern report, Carcello and Neal (2000) find that for 
firms experiencing financial distress, the likehood of auditor issuing a going-on concern report is 
critical to the percentage of affiliated directors in the audit committee i.e. the high the percentage 
of these members the less likely the auditor issue the going-on concern report. 
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 Research studies investigating the relation of consulting fees and auditor’s independence 
have mixed results. For example, Defond, Raghunandan and Subramanyam (2002) find no 
evidence that non audit fees reduce auditor’s independence when they measure independence 
with respect to auditor issuance of a going concern report, however, earlier studies by Parkash 
and Venable (1993) show that agency costs help explain the level of recurring nonaudit services 
purchased by firms from their external auditors. As management ownership decreases so does the 
incentive to make decisions that are aligned with the interest of the shareholders. This increases 
agency costs hence creates the need for high quality audits (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Accordingly, Parkash and Venable (1993) find that firms with low management ownership tend 
to purchase relatively less nonaudit services indicating such firms may want to retain the 
perception of auditor independence. 
  Research studies closely linked with auditor knowledge and expertise find domain-
specific knowledge (i.e. task specific and industry-specific specialization) has positive impact on 
auditor judgment and decision process thus the level of audit quality(Knechel et al. 2012). 
Specifically, some experimental studies show that companies audited by auditors with industrial- 
specific knowledge are less likely to be involved with fraudulent financial  reporting (Carcello 
and Nagy 2002) are associated with lower level of information asymmetry(Schauer 2002; Dunn 
and Mayhew 2004) and are less likely to restate their financial statements ( Fleming et al. 2008 ). 
This suggests that auditors with industry-specific knowledge are likely to detect financial 
misstatements and management anticipating this is less likely to engage in fraudulent reporting.  
2.2 Research Question and Methodology 
 Inspired by previous academic research, discussions held in class lectures and recent 
events and factors surrounding financial institutions failures both in Europe and USA has led to 
an increased desire to research further and gain a deeper understanding  of the role and value of 
external audits, the challenges faced by audit professionals and factors that  influence audit 
quality. 
 The aim of the Master thesis is to evaluate the role of the auditors in financial institutions. 
This is of significance because i) financial institutions play a vital role in the growth of economy 
in that they provide an avenue for businesses and investors to borrow and lend money in a safe 
environment, ii) the interconnectedness of financial institutions means that the failure of one 
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financial institution may cause shocks that may have an adverse effect on financial markets and 
the economy as a whole and iii) their business operations in volatile environment and complexity 
of the financial products create a unique but challenging auditing environment that require 
auditors’ expertise and sound judgment  in order to provide high quality audits. 
The problem statement of this paper is: 
1) To what extent are auditors responsible for failing to identify fraudulent 
financial statements? 
2) To what extent do financial standards contribute to audit failure? 
 To answer the questions posed, the case analysis method is used. The case of Lehman 
Brothers is selected because it provides the analysis with all the important key elements in 
understanding the role and value of external audits, the challenges faced by audit professionals in 
a complex evolving business environment and factors that influence the audit quality. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The third section consists of a brief 
introduction of corporate governance. The fourth section gives a historical overview of Lehman 
Brothers Holding and the circumstances leading to its bankruptcy. The fifth section consists of 
the case analysis. Finally, the sixth section contains a summary and discussion of the limitation of 
the analysis. 
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3. Corporate Governance 
 Weak corporate governance has been linked to fraudulent financial reporting (Dechow et 
al. 1996; Beasley 1996) and failure of financial institutions leading to a negative impact on the 
local or even global economy.  Given the significance of the relationship between reliability of 
financial reporting and the quality of corporate governance, it is therefore essential to establish 
strong corporate governance for the smooth running of financial institutions in an evolving and 
complex business world (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Manual 2006).  
 Corporate governance can therefore be seen as a system that provides the structure 
through which corporate goals are set and methods of achieving these goals and monitoring 
performance are determined (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Manual 2006). The 
manner in which management and board of directors govern business affairs should promote 
transparency and trust among its shareholders and other stakeholders. A strong transparent 
relationship creates a conductive environment for fostering strong effective corporate governance.  
 With strong effective corporate governance in place, financial institutions are able to 
minimizing chances of fraudulent financial reporting and maintain investors’ confidence. This 
minimizes liquidity crisis, bank runs, lowers cost of capital and negative economic implications. 
It is therefore important for management and board of directors to choose and implement the 
right policies, appropriate internal controls and to monitor compliance which are key elements to 
ensure that the daily business operations and employee behavior are in line with applicable 
regulations and aligned with the shareholders expectations.   
 Maintaining strong effective corporate governance can therefore be viewed as a 
continuous effort from management and the board of directors who have the right incentives in 
place to act in the best interest of their shareholders and other stakeholders. This is easier done in 
principle than in practice, as research findings show, there exists a conflict of interest between 
management and shareholders. If management does not have the proper incentives in place, it 
may pursue objectives and goals that are not always aligned with the interest of the financial 
institutions and its shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
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3.1 Conflict of interest 
 The relationship between corporate management and business owners can be described 
under the principle-agency theory framework.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) define this 
relationship as a contractual agreement under which a manager (agent) is employed to carry out 
certain business transactions on behalf of the business owner (principle). This empowers the 
manager to initiate and implement important business decisions on behalf of his or her employer.  
However, since the manager is not a “residual claimer” he or she does not share the major effects 
on business profitability as a result of his or her actions (Fama and Jensen 1983).  
 The separation of business ownership from management increase conflicts of interest 
arising from the owner’s desire to maximize profits and the manager’s incentives to maximize his 
or her utility by engaging in activities which may not necessary be in the best interest of the 
business owner (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). These incentives are known 
to increase as the gap between business ownership and management widens (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1986).  
 With increased incentives to maximize utility by engaging in activities which may not be 
aligned with the interest of the business owner i.e. undertaking risky investments at the expense 
of the business owner and investors increases the temptation to cheat by issuance of fraudulent or 
misleading financial reports.  This reduces transparency and increases agency costs.  Potential 
investors and creditors anticipating the possibility of risks associated with agency costs and 
unable to correctly value the firm will demand low share prices and high cost of capital 
respectively (Akerlof 1970). 
 High cost of capital and low share prices decreases firm’s value, consequently, increasing 
the risks associated with the loss of owners’ wealth. This raises the need for placing monitoring 
mechanisms such as independent audits and bonding that mitigates these risks by enhancing 
transparency between management, owners and investors (Watts 1977).   
3.2 Importance of Independent Audits 
 The significance of independent audits serving as effective monitoring devices to 
mitigated risks associated with conflict of interests (Jensen Meckling, 1976; Watts 1977; Watts 
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and Zimmerman, 1986 and Powell 1999) can be traced back as early as the Medieval England 
period (Watts and Zimmerman 1983).  The medieval merchants were in general businessmen 
who owned and operated small business firms with the aim of making profits. Their trade 
involved purchasing of goods from the producers and selling them in available markets. This 
meant that the merchants had to physically collect the goods from the producers and transport 
them to the available markets (Greif et al 1994; Kohl 2009).  
 Given the nature and size of their businesses, it was possible for the merchants to be able 
to operate their business without any problems. In order to maximize profits, merchants searched 
for good business deals which involved negotiating with producers to get the cheapest price 
available and sell the products at the highest price possible. In addition, the merchant tried to 
reduce direct costs i.e. transportation by collaborating with other merchants through merchants 
associations (Kohl 2009). 
 Merchants associations (i.e. merchant guilds) were volunteer groups that were formed to 
facilitate the smooth running of trade by ensuring that traders complied with trading rules and 
imposed fines or punishment to those who did not (Greif et al 1994). In addition, they searched 
and secured business opportunities and provided protection for their members. This helped the 
merchants to utilize their time and resources in securing goods and mitigated risks associated 
with loss of goods through robbery, piracy and sometimes through exaction of payments i.e. fines, 
taxes at different “check points” such as bridges and ports (Greif et al 1994; kohl 2009). 
 As trade evolved and new markets emerged, merchants found themselves with new 
opportunities to expand their businesses to different locations (distant markets). However, with 
new opportunities came new challenges (Kohl 2009). Given the nature of merchant’s business, in 
order for the merchant to take advantage of the business opportunities at hand, he had to rely on 
others (i.e. hire agents who resided in distant markets, rely on family members or close friends). 
Entrusting others with his business left the merchant exposed to either misconduct (i.e. agents 
acting in their own best interest or incompetence of the people he relied on) since he was not 
always present to observe their actions (Watts and Zimmerman 1983; Kohl 2009).  
 To mitigate the risk associated with reliance or agency cost, the merchant associations 
played an important role as independent party in assisting the merchant to monitor the actions of 
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the agents in distant markets. For example, in medieval England, an independent committee of 
about four members was selected to audit the merchant guilds accounts and verify if the agents 
complied with their contractual agreements (Watts and Zimmerman 1983). In addition, merchants 
received independent information from the merchant associations in regards to the agents’ 
behavior and business opportunities presented to them. The merchants would then use this 
information to verify if the information they received from their agents was credible (Kohl 2009).  
 Fast forward, despite the fact that business structure has and continues to evolve through 
technology innovation, independent audits remain to be essential monitoring mechanisms. This is 
important in two ways. First, having corporate financial information audited by an independent 
auditor adds credibility to the information and assures users of the financial statements that the 
information is a fair presentation of the firm’s financial health and can be trusted to make 
important investment decisions (Soltan 2007; Stuart 2011). Second, it enhances transparency 
between management, owners and stakeholders hence serves as a signal that the management 
incentives are aligned with the interest of the shareholders (Watts 1977).  
  Increased transparency and credibility of financial information has an economic effect 
since it reduces agency costs and potential risks associated with these costs hence improving 
firm’s value. For example, given that financial information is reliable, investors and creditors can 
fairly value the firm. This reduces the “market of lemons” problem and as a result investors and 
creditors will be willing to pay the right amount for the company’s shares and accept a lower cost 
of capital respectively (Akerlof 1970; Soltan 2007). 
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4. The Case of Lehman Brothers  
4.1 Company Overview  
 The origins of Lehman Brothers Holdings can be traced back to 1844, when Henry the 
eldest son of Lehman at the age of 23 migrated to Montgomery, Alabama (Geisst 2006 Lehman 
Brothers Collection; Oliver and Goodwin, 2010; Obiri 2012; Knapp 2012). Henry established a 
small grocery shop selling dry goods and utensils to local cotton farmers (Lehman Brothers 
Collections, Baker). Six years later, Henry, together with his brothers, Emmanuel and Mayer, 
formed the Lehman Brothers. Their combined effort saw the business grow from a general 
merchandising to a commodities broker business that bought and sold cotton from the planters 
living in and around Montgomery (Geisst 2006, Lehman Brothers Collection; Oliver and 
Goodwin, 2010; Obiri 2012; Knapp 2012;).  
 After the death of their brother, Emmanuel and Mayer continued with the business and 
led the company for the next four decades (Lehman Brothers Collection, Bakery Library). During 
this period until 1920s, only family members had the right to become partners, with the exception 
of a brief partnership with cotton merchant (Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker Library). The 
partnership was formed to build a cotton warehouse to enabled Lehman to engage in larger sales 
and trades (Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker Library). 
 In 1958, Lehman opened an office in New York which gave the firm a stronger presence 
in the commodities trading business as well as a foothold in financial community (Geisst 2006, 
Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker Library; Obiri 2012; Knapp 2012). However, with much of 
its operations tied to the southern economy, Lehman’s business operations and financial position 
were adversely affected by hardship of the American Civil war and the company was practically 
bankrupt by the end of the war (Geisst 2006, Lehman Brothers Collection; Obiri 2012; Knapp 
2012). The firm was then rebuilt after the war and continued with its operations concentrated in 
the New York office (Geisst 2006, Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker Library; Obiri 2012; 
Knapp 2012).  
 In 1870, Lehman assisted in the formation of the New York Cotton Exchange, as the first 
commodities future trading venture. Mayer Lehman was appointed to its first board of directors. 
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In later years the firm also helped establish the Coffee exchange as well as the Petroleum 
exchange (Geisst 2006, Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker Library; Obiri 2012; Knapp 2012). 
4.2 Building a Financial Firm 
 The development of railroads after the Civil war helped usher America from farming to 
an industrial economy (Lehman Brothers Collections, Baker Library). With a flourishing railroad 
construction business, companies turned to financial markets to raise funds needed for 
expansions. This led to the introduction of the railroad bonds that were structured at affordable 
prices (Lehman Brothers Collections, Baker Library; Northrup 2003). The bonds were sold to 
individual investors, attracting new potential investors into the capital markets. Taking advantage 
of this opportunity, Lehman expanded its commodities business to include bond trading (Lehman 
Brothers Collection, Baker Library; Oliver and Goodwin, 2010). 
 In 1887 Lehman become a member of the New York Exchange as a merchant-banking 
firm (Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker). Over a period of 20 years, beginning in 1906, Lehman 
and Gold formed alliances to fund emerging retail industry. The two jointly underwrote securities 
issues for prominent retail industry names such as Sears, Roebuck & Co.; F.W. Woolworth Co.; 
May Department Stores; Gimbel Brothers, Inc (Geisst 2006, Lehman Brothers Collection, 
Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker Library; Oliver and Goodwin, 2010; Obiri 2012; Knapp 
2012). 
4.3 Emerging Markets 
 Lehman experienced significant growth under the leadership of Robert Lehman. He 
believed that consumption rather than production was the key to America’s future prosperity 
hence he steered the firm to support and finance early-staged/developing industries toward mass 
consumption (Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker Library). His commitment in identifying 
growth companies in different industries exposed Lehman to numerous investment opportunities 
as business evolved and companies became more innovative (Lehman Brothers Collection, 
Baker).    
 Lehman’s investment opportunities can be traced from the period of economic expansion 
in 1950, driven by arrival of electronic and computer technology to the period of great expansion 
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of the oil industry. During the electronic age, the firm helped launch Litton industries and 
underwrote Digital Equipment Corporation first public offering. Lehman invested in future 
industry leaders, QUALCOMM and Loral Corporation as well as Murphy Oil, the development 
of Kerr-McGee’s oil gas exploration and production business (Lehman Brothers Collection, 
Baker).The firm also advised on consolidation of the Keith-Albee and Orpheum theaters which 
resulted to the largest vaudeville circuit with more than 700 theaters. In addition, Lehman helped 
in funding Radio-Keith-Orpheum, Paramount Pictures and 20
th
 century Fox, airline companies 
and continued their involvement in supporting the retailing industry (Lehman Brothers 
Collections, Baker Library).  
 Lehman’s other notable accomplishment was its involvement in raising funds for 
companies during the great depression. The firm helped devise a new financing method known as 
“private placement” which included strict lender protection measures to help mediate risk and 
encourage investment (Lehman Brothers Collections, Baker Library). As a result borrowers and 
lenders had the opportunity to raise needed capital and receive a good return with a tolerable 
level of risk respectively (Lehman Brothers Collections, Baker Library). In 1960s, Lehman 
expanded its capital markets trading capabilities in the area of commercial paper which led to its 
appointment as an official dealer for the U.S. Treasuries. In addition, Lehman increased its global 
presence by opening offices in Europe and Asia (Geisst 2006, Lehman Brothers Collection; Obiri 
2012; Knapp 2012). 
4.4 Power Struggle 
 In 1969, the death of Robert Lehman left a huge leadership void in the firm and combined 
with difficult economic environment led to poor financial performance. In 1973, Pete Peterson, 
the chairman and CEO of Bell and Howell was hired to rescue the firm. During his leadership, 
Peterson was able to steer Lehman Brothers from significant operational losses to five 
consecutive years of operational profits marked with a high return in equity in the investment 
banking industry (Aulette 1986; Eshanda 2010). 
 In 1975 Lehman Brothers acquired Abraham & Co and two years later merged with Kuhn, 
Loeb & Co to form the 4
th
 largest bank in the country (Aulette 1986; Eshanda 2010; Oliver & 
Goodwin 2010; Obiri, 2012). However, Lehman Brothers had a very competitive and 
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dysfunctional internal environment that increased hostility and relationship alienation between 
investment bankers and traders (Aulette 1986; Oliver and Goodwin, 2010; Eshanda 2010). Most 
of this hostility was drive by how bonuses were allocated and distributed. The investor bankers 
seemed to receive a high bonus compared to the traders who contributed two thirds of Lehman 
Brothers revenues (Eshanda 2010; Aulette 1986).  
 To try and mitigate this hostility and promote teamwork, Peterson, in 1983, appointed 
Lew Gluckman to co-CEO with him in spite of the differences that existed between the two men 
(Eshanda 2010; Aulette 1986). Peterson had an investment banking background and strongly 
believed that the key to a successful business was centered around building relationship with 
clients, personal advice to corporation and underwriting (Aulette 1986; Eshanda 2010) while 
Gluckman believed that people’s taste had changed and that they were more interested in short-
investments with quick returns rather than the traditional long-term investments (Aulette 1986, 
Eshanda 2010). To this extent he believed that success of the investment banking depended on its 
ability to design and created products that offered high returns and as a result entice clients to 
listen to their advice (Ho 2005). 
 The differences in opinion in regards to running the company, combined with changes 
that Gluckman introduce in effect did not mitigate but increased the tension in Lehman Brothers’ 
internal environment. This resulted to Peterson’s resignation leaving Gluckman as the sole CEO 
(Aulette 1986; Anderson 2007; Eshanda 2010). In addition, Lehman Brother lost some of its 
experienced investment bankers (Anderson 2007). 
 In 1984, after experiencing significant financial hardship, the firm was sold to 
Shearson/American Express for $360M to form Shearson Lehman/American Express (Cole 1984; 
Anderson 2007; Oliver and Goodwin, 2010).  
4.5 A New Era 
 Ten years later, in 1994, Lehman Brothers was spun off from American Express and 
become an independent public company worth $75million in earnings and had 2.2% returns on 
equity (Oliver and Goodwin, 2010).  
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 As the newly elected CEO, Dick Fuld, who had survived through the Lehman’s internal 
warfare (Oliver and Goodwin, 2010) decided to steer the firm from a small bond trading firm 
known for its internal competitive but dysfunctional culture towards a new culture that embraced 
teamwork and ownership (Lehman Brothers annual report 2007). To this extent he made 
significant changes in employees’ compensation packages and shares allocations (Oliver and 
Goodwin 2010).For example, in 1994 only 4% of shares were owned by employees but by 2006 
employees owned 30% of the company shares (Oliver and Goodwin, 2010). 
 Under Fuld’s leadership, Lehman experienced significant financial growth. For instance 
Lehman reported net positive earnings for a period of 13 years between 1994 till 2007. Lehman 
also experience an increase in market capitalization of USD 45billion in 2007 compared to USD 
2 billion in 1994 (Oliver and Goodwin, 2010). Lehman stock’s traded at $62.63 by November 
2007 compared to $36.11 in November 2003. In addition, Lehman’s financial services expanded 
to cover three main areas of business operations i.e. capital market, investment banking and 
investment management. The capital market segment contributed to 64% of total revenue while 
the investment banking and management segments contributed to 20% and 16% respectively 
(Lehman Brothers Annual Report 2007).  
 The capital market segment consisted of fixed income and equities and involved trading 
of financial instruments and research coverage. The capital market’s major increase in percentage 
revenue was contribute by the growth of commercial and real estate mortgage business and 
equity offerings especially in non-US regions. However, the disruption of market condition as a 
result of mortgage crisis led to decline in revenue compared to other consecutive years (Lehman 
Brothers Annual Report).  
 The investment banking segment consisted of global finance and advisory services while 
investment management segment consisted of asset management and private investment 
management mainly for high net worth clients, mutual funds and institutional investors. Global 
finance and advisory services involved a range of activities which included and not limited to 
underwriting services, private placement, leverage finance, merger and acquisitions, restructuring 
and other corporate activities (Lehman Brothers Annual Report).    
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 Towards the end of 1990, Lehman established a vertical integrated business model linking 
its origination capabilities and its capital expertise (Lehman Brothers annual report 2006). At the 
same time the U.S. subprime market traced back to the enactment of the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977 was experiencing significant growth and proved to be a 
profitable business and investment opportunity for many banks (Markham 2010).   
4.5.1 Subprime Markets  
 Subprime loans were loans issued to borrowers with poor or no credit history (Gramlich; 
Jansen el at 2008). The implication of these loans was an increase in risk associated with high 
probability of default and as a result subprime borrowers paid high interest rates and fees 
compared to their A-Credited counterparties (Gramlich 2007; Jansen el at 2008). This increase in 
high interest rates and fees made it impossible for majority of low income US citizens to own a 
home.  
 To promote home ownership for all citizens, the US government sought to change the 
subprime market which was primary dominated by non-conventional lenders by engaging the 
banks to make subprime loans available to the poor. To that effect the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act of 1975(HMDA) required banks in metropolitan areas to disclose their mortgage 
loans classification and geographic location to exposure and discourage the redlining practice in 
which banks concentrated their lending in wealthier neighborhoods(Fishbein & Essene 2010).  
Two years later, the banks were ranked by their Community ReinvesmentAct compliance and 
were pressured to offer subprime loans as a precondition for approval of their merger which was 
at that time the banking model for growth (Markham, 2010).  
 The issuance of subprime loans by banks did not make the loans less risky. However, 
securitization of these loans allowed the banks to diversify the risk by moving the loans off their 
balance sheets and lenders to transfer these risks to investors that had a greater risk tolerance 
(Brunnermeier 2009; Markham 2010).  Lehman like other investment banks provided funds for 
financing the subprime loans. In addition, Lehman also repurchased and securitized these loans 
into structured financial products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). These financial products were then grouped into different 
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tranches
1
 and received different credit ratings from renowned credit rating agencies (CRA). With 
good credit rating of triple and double As and a few triple Bs, the financial products seemed 
riskless (low default possibility) and become highly marketable both in the European and 
American capital markets (Markham 2010).  
  During this period mortgage business experienced significant growth and there was high 
liquidity in the market as result of an increase in demand for these high yield financial products. 
Lehman like other counterparties seized the opportunity and expanded its growth through 
acquisitions of subprime mortgage originators. For example between the period 2003 and 2004, 
Lehman acquisitions included BNC Mortgage and Aurora Loan Services, which specialized in 
Alt-A loans
2
 (Snyder 2011). While investment in these acquisitions proved to be profitable 
during the mortgage market boom, this positioning, however, left Lehman vulnerable to risk of 
great losses in case of downturn in mortgage markets.  
 High liquidity in the market and coupled with a high demand for financial products also 
contributed to a lax of regulation. Mortgage lenders and brokers motivated by the incentive 
structures that were based on number loan closures, lowed their lending standards and began to 
tap to a new group of borrowers who had very low credit scores and/or no prove of source of 
income (Keys el at 2008). These borrowers were offered mortgage loans at adjusted interest rate 
which initially started with low “teaser” interest rates that were affordable and adjusted to higher 
interest rates in later stages essentially requiring the borrower to refinance the mortgage 
(Brunnermeier 2009). With rising home prices, the subprime borrowers were able to build equity 
in their homes hence able to refinance these loans (Gordon 2010). 
4.5.2 Effects of Interest Rates on Subprime Mortgage Business 
 In the period between 2004 and 2006, the Federal Reserve with the aim to constrict 
inflationary pressure, slowly increased the interest rates resulting in contraction of the money 
supply (Besley and Brigham 2012, 2011; Bianco 2008). With a low money supply and higher 
                                                          
1
 A tranche defined is  as“ a portion of several related securities that are offered at the same time but with different 
risks” or “ a group of securities that share the same characteristics and form a part of pool investment”  
(investopedia.com and dictionary.reference.com) 
  
2
 Alt-A loans are mortgage related loans that fall between the subprime loans and the typical prime loans. The loans 
have a less degree of risk than subprime loans but still risky compared to the prime loans.  
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interest rates resulted to a slight decline in housing demand. At the same time the adjusted 
mortgage rates began to reset to their new higher interest rates. This created a new situation given 
the background of the subprime borrowers. With difficulty to meet their obligation to pay the 
high mortgage interest rates, their only option was to sell their homes. However, with no 
possibility to lower prices in the face of lower demand  and coupled with no resources to pay 
realtor fees, it was impossible to sell their homes resulting to an increase in foreclosures and 
mortgage loans defaults (Brunnermeier 2009). 
 Increased foreclosures and defaults led to decline in housing values. This declined also 
began to have an indirect effect on securitized financial products (Bianco 2008; Brunnermeier 
2009). The reason for this is because like other securities, mortgage-backed financial products 
usually received risk valuations using historical mortgage data. In addition, each mortgage-
backed security had an underlying cashflow that was generated by interest payments of mortgage 
related loans. Since mortgage loans were usually bundled together and repackaged as riskless or 
high yield securities, it was therefore difficult for market participants to differentiate between the 
securities that were highly exposed to risk associated with default and foreclosures and those that 
were not. Hence inability to distinguish between these securities assets resulted to a panic in the 
financial markets and loss of investors’ confidence in these products.  
4.5.3 The Beginning of Lehman’s Problems  
   Lehman major investments were tied to the mortgage business and about 64% of its 
revenue was generated through the fixed income and equities business operations. In addition, 
Lehman relied on the repo markets to finance its daily operations and consequently, used security 
inventory on its balance sheet as collateral (Lehman Brother Annual report 2007; Valukas 2010). 
Since these securities remained on Lehman’s balance sheet for the repo transcation period, an 
increase in loss of investor’s confidence in mortgage-backed assets would adversely affect 
Lehman’s relationship with its counterparties and its ability to raise enough short term capital for 
its daily activities. 
 To see how this is possible, imagine an investor for some reason loses confidence in a 
particular financial security. This would increase the investor’s incentive to find a ready market 
to sell the security. Now, assuming that this is a wide spread of loss of confidence in the same 
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financial assets, more investors would want to trade their securities hence a high supply of these 
assets in the financial market. An increase in the assets would automatically suppress prices. 
Given the fact that a financial institution like Lehman may be holding the same kind of financial 
assets in its balance sheet, this would adversely affects its financial position as it recognizes 
losses as a result of decline in asset values. Counterparties perceiving these losses and fearing for 
more risk exposure because of uncertainty in the financial institution’s creditworthiness will 
demand more collateral or decline business with the firm. This in turn will affect the firm’s 
ability to raise short-term financing, negatively affecting its daily activities.  
 Because of Lehman high concentrated long-term investments in mortgage related assets 
(Valukas 2010), adverse changes in the mortgage market increased a lot of pressure in the firm. 
For one, Lehman needed to have the ability to repay its repo positions in order to maintain a 
positive relationship with counterparties, consequently securing continuous capital to support its 
daily business endeavors (Lehman Brothers Annual Report, 2007). Two, as a financial institution 
it was necessary for Lehman to have the ability to manage its balance sheet in response to 
fluctuations in anticipated risk and asset prices (Greenlaw et al 2008).  In financial institutions 
unlike in other non-financial institutions the changes in leverage and changes in balance sheet 
size are positively related, thus the institutions adjust their balance sheets in such a way that 
leverage is high during the booms and low during busts periods (Greenlaw et al 2008).  
 For illustration purposes, assume that a financial institution has securities worth $100, 
debt worth $70 and equity worth $30. Suppose there is a decline in securities prices such that the 
value of the security holdings falls from $100 to $80. Since debt remains constant, equity will 
need to be adjusted in order to balance the left and the right side of the balance sheet. Thus the 
new changes are reflected in Exhibit 1. 
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Changes in Leverage ratios 
Exhibit 1:  Changes in leverage ratios  
Before decline in securities prices After decline in securities prices 
 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
 Securities    $100 Equity      $30 Securities        $80 Equity               $10 
  Debt        $70  Debt                  $70 
 
Leverage        3,33 
 
Leverage          8,00 
 
 Leverage is calculated as securities divided by equity 
 If the financial firm’s target is to maintain a leverage of 5 it would be necessary for the 
firm to sell securities worthy $30 and pay down debt worth $30. Managing the balance sheet is 
therefore essential in order to strengthen the balance sheet by reducing its size through sales of 
assets and payment of existing debt during the bust periods. This signals the firm’s ability to 
meets its financial obligations. Inability to manage its balance sheet would have therefore 
resulted in Lehman maintaining a high leverage ratio which would have served as a negative 
signal to its creditors and investors as well as result in down grading their credit rating (Valukas 
2010).   
 The credit rating was important to Lehman because low credit rating would adversely 
affect its liquidity and competitive position. Consequently, increasing the cost of borrowing and 
the likelihood of high exposure to risk associated with financial distress and bankruptcy (Lehman 
Brothers Annual Financial report 2007). As an financial institution dependent on repos for daily 
running of business operations as well as its interconnection with other financial institutions it 
was therefore necessary to ensure that its credit rating was unaffected (Lehman Brothers Annual 
Financial Report 2007). Faced with these two dilemmas, Lehman had incentives to find a 
solution that would both lower its leverage and provide the necessary finances to repay its repo 
loans. This would enable Lehman to maintain good relationship with its counterparties hence 
securing the source of funding for smooth running of the firm business operations.    
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4.5.4 The Lehman’s Options and Dilemmas  
 In general, depending on its financial needs, a business corporation may opt to use 
internal generated finances to support its business operations or raise needed capital through 
issuance of debt or new equity offering (Myers and Majluf 1984). Lehman had only two of these 
options at its disposal to help manage its balance sheet hence lower its leverage ratio. However, 
generating internal finances or raising capital through issuance of new equity had negative impact 
on the overall value of the firm consequently lowering its stock prices. 
 For one, to generate internal finances, Lehman would have to sell some of its security 
inventories. Most of these securities were directly or indirectly linked to mortgage business. 
However, because of the increase in foreclosure and default, investors had lost confidence in 
these assets hence making it difficult to find a ready market to sell them (Brunnermeier 2009; 
Valukas 2010). In addition, more investors and financial institutions also had the incentives to 
sell off their mortgage related securities. An increase in supply and a decline in demand for these 
securities resulted to the financial markets flooded with devalued securities. Furthermore even if 
Lehman was successful in selling some of its security inventories, it would have to sell them at a 
discount which would have negative implications on the firm’s overall performance (Valukas 
2010). 
 Second, through issuance of new equity, Lehman had the opportunity to raise need capital 
to pay off some of its debts. This would enable Lehman to rebalance its balance sheet, hence 
lower its leverage ratio. However, issuance of new equity would not only lower stock prices 
( Myers and Majluf 1984, Jensen1986) but also be perceived as a sign of desperation( Brealey et 
al 2008) and therefore prevented Lehman to lower its leverage ratio by means of equity issues 
( Valukas 2010). To avoid the negative implications on stock prices as well as maintain its 
counterparties’ confidence, Lehman opted to significantly reduce its leverage ratio by 
manipulating its accounts through repurchase agreements (Valukas 2010).  
4.5.5 Sales and Repurchase Agreements 
In practice, financial institutions use the repo markets to raise short-term capital through 
repurchase agreements to support their daily business operations (Valukas 2010). Sales and 
repurchase agreements can therefore be defined as transactions involving two parties, where one 
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of the parties transfers a security to the other party as collateral in exchange of short-term capital 
(cash). The agreement is that the borrower will repay the cash plus interest and take back the 
security at the date of maturity (Madura 2010). Mostly, financial institutions treated the repo 
agreements as financing and therefore these securities used as collateral remained in the 
borrower’s balance sheet. However, under certain conditions, it was possible for financial 
institutions to reclassify repurchase agreements as “sales” if the transactions met the sales 
requirement criteria provided under the provision of accounting for transfers and servicing of 
financial assets and extinguishment of liabilities, SFAS 140. 
 Lehman, like other financial institutions raised short term capital on a daily basis to 
finance their business operations (Valukas 2010) consequently, treating the transactions as 
financing (Lehman Brothers Annual Report 2007). However, Lehman also employed a different 
type of repo transactions known within the company as Repo 105. These transactions were 
similar to Lehman’s normal financing repurchase agreements both in structure and magnitude. 
This means that the transactions were conducted using the same type of collateral, had similar 
counterparties and Lehman received coupon payments from the transferred securities (Valukas 
2010). Given the similarity, Lehman executed the Repo 105 transactions in the same way as the 
normal financing repurchase transactions with the exception of the accounting treatment (i.e. the 
Repo 105 transactions were classified as sales). 
 Most of Lehman’s repurchase transactions classified for as “sales” were true financing 
repurchase agreements and therefore the transferred securities should have remained on Lehman’ 
balance sheet during the repo term (SFAS 140 Manual). The incoming borrowed cash would 
have increased its total assets and total liabilities simultaneously as Lehman would have recorded 
a corresponding liability representing its obligation to repay the borrowed cash.  The leverage 
ratio and the balance sheet figures would have increased as well due to the changes recorded.  
Assuming that Lehman brothers would have used the borrowed cash to pay off some of its debt, 
there would have been no effect on its leverage ratios and the balance sheet figures would have 
remained  the same since the borrowed cash would correspond to the debt paid.  
 In order to be able to document that the Repo 105 transactions were true “sales” and could 
be accounted for as sales under the provision of SFAS 140:9 & 98, i) Lehman had to ensure that 
neither the firm or its creditor had access to the transferred assets even in the event of a 
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bankruptcy (SFAS 140 Manual, Paragraphs 27-28), ii) Lehman‘s counterparties (transferee) had 
the right and freedom to use the assets as they saw fit without any constrains (SFAS 140 
Manual ,Paragraphs 29-34), and iii) Lehman had no direct or indirect control over the transferred 
assets through agreements that gave Lehman the right to repurchase the securities before their 
maturity or cause  the buyer to retain the assets other than through a cleanup call ( SFAS 140 
Manual, Paragraphs 50-54). 
 To that extent, Lehman Brothers demonstrated that it isolated the transferred securities 
from itself and its creditors by obtaining a letter of “true” sale opinion (Valukas 2010; Lehman 
Brothers Accounting Manual). The proof of isolation of transferred securities under the SFAS 
140 provision was considered only if “there was a true sale at law” and therefore by obtaining 
this letter,  Lehman was able to meet this requirement (AU Section 336; 9336). Further, Lehman 
employed a high “haircut” to prove that it had “relinquished its control” over the transferred 
securities. Relinquishing control meant that Lehman had surrendered its “contractual rights and 
obligation to repurchase transferred or identical and /or substantially the same securities as those 
it had sold” (SFAS 140 Manual, paragraph 218) 
 Normally, the SFAS 140:29-34 guidelines for financing repurchase agreements,  requires 
counterparties involved in these transactions to use highly liquid securities with 98% 
collateralization for repurchasing firms and 102% overcollateralization for security lenders. In 
addition, the transferred securities are to be valued at fair value, meaning that prices were 
adjusted according to market fluctuations. Since Lehman employed repurchase agreements with a 
fixed income security margined at 105% or equity security margined at 107% of the cash 
received, these repurchase agreements fell outside the SFAS 140:29-34 guidelines. This indicated 
that Lehman had relinquished control over its transferred securities (Lehman Brothers’ 
Accounting Policy Manual). 
 In addition to acquiring a letter of true sale opinion and employing a high “haircut”, 
Lehman set a firm wide limit on daily repo 105/108 transactions. These transactions comprised 
highly liquid securities (Valukas 2010; Lehman Brothers’ Accounting Policy Manual). By 
meeting the SFAS 140 sales treatment requirement criteria, Lehman was legally able to remove 
the securities inventory from its balance sheet (Valukas 2010). 
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4.5.6 Origination of Repo 105 transactions  
 To appreciate the magnitude of the repo transactions, it is important to discuss the 
circumstances surrounding Lehman letter of “sales” true opinion.  As mentioned earlier, for 
isolation to be considered under the FSAS 140 provision, there must be a true “sale” at law. Thus 
to demonstrate that a firm and its creditors have no access to transferred securities even in the 
event of bankruptcy, the firm had to seek a true sale opinion letter from a legal specialist. Lehman 
could not secure a true “sale” opinion letter from a US lawyer, since “repos could not be treated 
as sales in the US because the lawyers could not provide a true sale opinion under the US law” 
(Lehman Accounting Manual). However, Lehman was able to secure a true sale opinion letter 
from Linklaters, a law from based in the UK (Valukas 2010; Lehman Brothers Accounting 
Manual). 
 The letter was addressed to Lehman Brothers International (LBIE) based in London and 
was to be used for the entity’s business operations. If the letter was to be used for other purposes 
another than what it was intended for, consent from the law firm was required. However, Lehman 
was permitted to provide a copy of the letter to its auditors for the purpose of preparing financial 
statements (Valukas 2010). Since the “ true sales opinion was limited to the English law as 
applied to the English courts and was given on the basis that it would be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the English law”, Lehman carried out all its Repo transactions  in 
UK (Valukas, 2010).  
 Although the letter was intended to be used in connection to LBIE business transactions, 
LBIE executed a significant volume of repurchase agreements on behalf of some of the US based 
Lehman entities (Valukas). For transactions originating from securities owned by US based 
entities, LBIE received securities worth $105 via intercompany repurchase transaction and $5 
from Lehman Brothers Holding (LBHI) to be used for cash transfer. LBIE then would find a 
suitable European counterparty using these securities for an exchange of $100 cash. It would then 
transfer the $100 cash it received from the proceedings plus the $5 it had received from LBHI 
back to the US based Lehman entity.  The US based Lehman entity would then use the money to 
repay its short-term debt. At maturity, LBIE would repurchase the securities from the European 
counterparty and the return the securities to the US based Lehman entity through the 
intercompany repurchase transaction. Exhibit 2 represents the Repo transaction process. 
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Exhibit 2: Lehman Brothers Repo 105 transaction process 
 
 
Source: LBEX-WGM 748491 
 
 When LBIE undertook repurchase transactions originating from its own securities, it 
transferred securities worth 105$ or 108$ in exchange of 100$ cash which it used to repay its 
short term liabilities. At repo maturity, LBIE would then repay the borrow cash plus interest in 
exchange of the securities. LBIE financial results were consolidated to Lehman Brothers Holding 
financial statements hence affecting LBHI public reported balance sheet and leverage ratios 
(Valukas 2010).   
4.5.7 Repo 105 transactions Balance Sheet Effect 
 The use of Repo 105 transactions had a significant impact on Lehman’s ability to manage 
its balance sheet and leverage ratios. First, reclassifying and accounting for  Repo transactions as 
“sale”, Lehman, was able to temporary remove some of the security inventory from its balance 
sheet without having to record a liability indicating its obligation to repay the borrowed cash  
( SFAS 140: 9, 11a, and  98). 
Repo 105 
  Cash 
$105 
Cash 
$105 
Cash 
$100 
Gvt Bond  
$105 
Gvt Bond  
$105 
Gvt Bond  
$105 
Cash 
$5 
LBSF Street Counterparty LBIE 
Original Purchase 
LBHI 
         (no haircut) 
Intercompany 
Repo 
$5 Derivative asset 
established as MTM on 
forward purchase 
28 
  
 Second, using the cash received from Repo 105 transactions, Lehman was able to repay 
short term liabilities of the same amount. Temporary removal of security inventory from its 
balance sheet and repayment of short term liabilities worth of the same amount decreased both its 
total assets and liabilities. With declining changes in total assets and total liabilities, the gross and 
net leverage were also decreased (Valukas 2010). By effectively reducing its balance sheet size 
and leverage ratios Lehman demonstrated its ability to manage its balance sheet in response to 
fluctuations in anticipated risk and asset prices (Greenlaw et al 2008). Consequently, increasing 
investors’ confidence and avoiding down grading of its credit rating.  
 Exhibits 3 to 5 in the appendix give numerical overviews of the repo 105 transactions 
effect on Lehman’s balance sheet and leverage ratio.   
4.6 The Fall of Lehman Brothers  
 The negative effect of an increase in delinquencies and foreclosures on the U.S. mortgage 
became evident in the beginning of 2007(Brunnermeier 2009). And by mid-2007, the subprime 
crisis had rapidly spread and its impact strongly felt in the financial markets. As assets prices 
became subject to market fluctuations it become even harder to value mortgage backed securities 
used as collateral in the repo markets (Hördahl and King 2008). Since these securities remained 
in the counterparties’ balance sheet, it also created uncertainty in regards to the counterparties’ 
ability to meet financial obligation without defaulting as a result of risk exposure associated with 
the securities. 
  Uncertainty in the repo markets and intensified financial turmoil created a high demand 
for riskless securities and increased cost of borrowing (i.e. market participants in the repo 
demanded more collateral) making market access more difficult for financial institutions to raise 
short-term financing to support their daily business operations (Hördahl and King 2008). At the 
same time, market participants and credit agencies began demanding investment banks to 
decrease their leverage or face down grading of their credit ratings (Valukas 2010). 
 The collapse of two Bears Steams’ hedge funds highly exposed to the sub-prime markets, 
the High Grade structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund and High Grade Structured 
Credit Strategies Fund, in June, further erode investors’ confidence in mortgage backed securities 
(Beams 2007;Reuters 2007). This loss of investors’ confidence was reflected by the sharp decline 
29 
  
of share prices for major investments banks including Lehman because of the kind of securities 
assets held in their balance sheet. 
 In response to the crisis and its impact, Lehman closed down some of its subprime units 
including BNC Mortgage (Onaran, 2007; Anderson and Baja, 2007). However, Lehman 
continued to invest in commercial and real estate mortgage markets in a belief that the sub-prime 
crisis was containable and had no major effects in these markets (Valukas 2010). For instance, 
late 2007, Lehman in partnership with Tishman Speyer participated in leverage buyout of 
Archstone-Smith, costing Lehman $22.2 billion (Johas and McSherry 2007; Brown 2012). In 
addition, during this period till mid-2008, Lehman top executives also focused on balance sheet 
management in order to lower Lehman leverage ratio and meet market’s expectations.  
 The events of early till mid-2008, including the near collapse of Bear Stearns in mid-
March and government announcement to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 
(Sorkin 2008; Berudette and Fitzgerald 2012) had further negative implications on Lehman’s true 
financial position. Market speculation in connection to Lehman’s survival was reflected on the 
steady decline of its stock prices (Einhorn 2008, Sorkin 2008; Berudette and Fitzgerald 2012). 
Surprisingly, in spite of the negative effects, Lehman still managed to report positive earnings for 
the first quarter and reduction of its balance sheet leverage ratios for the second quarter (Valukas 
2010; Lehman Q10-quarter reports, 2008). A net loss of $2.8 billion in the second quarter was 
however, offset by Lehman’s ability to raise $6 billion through equity offerings (Onaran and 
Harper2008) indicating some counterparties confidence in its ability to survive the crisis. 
 However, the continuance deterioration of mortgage market conditions made it difficult 
for Lehman to spring back to its normal financial position. In addition, because of loss of 
investors’ confidence, liquidity in the market began to tighten as more and more investors and 
counterparties became risk averse. Analysts closely tracking investment banks financial 
performance including Lehman began questioning Lehman’s valuation methods of certain 
mortgage assets and its ability to reduce its balance sheet leverage ratio (Einhorn 2008; Valukas 
2010). Press conference calls revealed that Callan, Lehman chief financial officer and other 
senior management avoided direct comments on analysts’ questions in regards to Lehman’s 
valuation and disclosure practices (Einhorn 2008; Valukas 2010). Evidently, Lehman recognized 
less write downs compared to its competitors. 
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 By mid-2008, Lehman had already begun talks with potential investors with an aim to 
raise new capital to offset the negative effects of the mortgage crisis, however, securing these 
deals proved difficult because of the kind of assets held in Lehman’s balance sheet (Yeon-hee 
2008; Yahow 2008). In addition, the announcement of Lehman’s projected loss of $3.9 billion in 
the third quarter as a result of write downs and cancellation of a possible investment deal with the 
Korea Development Bank in early September (Yarow 2008) further plummeted Lehman’s stock 
prices.  
 Between September 12 and 14, a series of emergency meetings with key CEOs on wall 
street, FED officials and Treasury Henry M. Paulson were held to discuss the fate of financial 
institutions and in particular Lehman. Treasury Paulson emphasized that there was no 
governmental intervention and therefore recommended finding other ways to raise capital and 
mitigate risks (Sorkin 2008). Without governmental assistance, it was optimal for Lehman to find 
a buyer and therefore Lehman began negotiation process with Barclays, a large U.K. commercial 
and investment bank. However, on September 14
th
, it was clear that the deal had fallen through 
after Barclays UK failed to obtain a regulatory approval from UK authorities as well as its 
management felt that sealing the deal was not in the shareholders’ best interest (Mollenkamp, 
Serena, Craig and Lucchetti 2008). 
   In the morning of September 15 at approximately 1:45 am ET, Lehman Brothers 
Holdings filed for bankruptcy protection.  The company had $ 639 billion in assets, $ 619 in debt 
and closed at a share price of $0.21. Lehman Brother became the largest bankruptcy filing in US 
history in comparison to Enron and WorldCom (Brickley 2008; Valukas 2010 
4.6.1 Causes and Effects 
 The failure of Lehman Brothers was as a result of the following, one,  the adoption of an 
aggressive growth business strategy which encouraged risk taking and high leverage exposed the 
firm to financial risk  in case of market downturn(Valukas 2010). Second, management not 
adhering to the firms risk appetite limits led them to make large undiversified investments (i.e. 
acquisitions in commercial real estate and subprime markets) which adversely affected the firm’s 
financial position when U.S. housing  markets began to decline (Jonas and  McSherry  
2007;Brown , 2012).  
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 Third, the management decision to ignore warning signs and continue to invest in the 
housing market in hope to “profit from counter-cyclical strategy” further exposed the firm to risk 
associated with these markets (Valukas 2010).The repercussion of these decisions was the loss of 
investors and counterparties confidence which was critical for Lehman Brothers to maintain. 
Inability to maintain confidence resulted to investors and counterparties pulling out of business 
deals with Lehman brothers and limited access to short term financial sources which affected its 
financial liquidity. Without liquidity the failure of Lehman Brothers was inventible (Sorkin 2008; 
Berudette and Fitzgerald 2012). 
 Being one of the largest investment banks with operations in the US and across the world, 
Lehman Brother’s failure had negative impact on the global financial system.  First, some 
financial institutions that were primarily involved with Lehman Brothers suffered huge losses. 
For instance the Reserve Primary Fund, a major player in the money market, invested millions of 
dollars in Lehman Bonds. On September 15
th
, the day Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy the 
$785million worth bonds become worthless. The losses that the fund incurred caused it to put a 
seven day freeze on investors redemptions as the net asset value of its shares fell below $ 1 
(McCabe, 2010). 
 Second, the uncertainty in regards to the nature of Lehman Brothers transactions with 
banks and other institutional investors further eroded confidence in the financial markets.  
Participants in the repo and money markets began withholding their money or demanded for 
secure collateral. In addition banks also become unwilling to lend to each other as a result of fear 
of default.  This contributed to the freezing of the credit markets resulting to government 
intervention to rescue the already fragile financial system. 
 Lastly, Lehman Brothers demise resulted to more than 75 separate bankruptcy 
proceedings and thousands of job losses (PricewaterCoopers 2009). As result thousands of people 
lost their source of income which meant that they were unable to meet their financial obligations 
such as mortgage payments, provision for the families and contribution to the society welfare in 
form of taxes among others. Inability to meet these financial obligations increased reliance on 
government assistance and unemployment benefits which in turn increased financial burden on 
the government. The overall effect was a decline in living standards and society welfare. 
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5.  Analysis  
 The analysis below is aimed at finding the circumstances under which the auditor can be 
held responsible for failure to identify fraudulent financial statements and/or under which context 
financial standards can contribute to audit failure. First, SEC Act of 1934 and 1933 and Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 provisions are reviewed. Second, Lehman Brothers business environment 
management and financial performance is assessed. Third the role of external auditor is evaluated. 
Based on these findings the conclusions are made. 
5.1 SEC Act of 1933/34 and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Provisions Review 
 The establishment of the Security Exchange Act of 1933 and 1934 was to provide 
guidelines in regards to securities traded in primary and secondary markets.  The SEC Act of 
1933 requires firms to disclose financial information once in connection to a firm’s security 
offering and the SEC Act of 1934 requires public traded companies to periodically file financial 
reports with the Security Exchange Commission (SEC). However, the main objective is to ensure 
that investors have access to adequate financial information that can be used to make informed 
investment decisions (SEC Act 1933 and SEC Act 1934 Manual). In addition, SEC also requires 
public traded companies to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
 Lehman Brothers, as a public traded global investment bank, had the obligation to ensure 
that its financial reporting process complied with the SEC Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
requirements. Compliance with the requirements meant that Lehman Brothers financial 
information provided to market participants in connection to its security offering and trade was 
free from any “misrepresentations, deceit or fraud” and had the adequate disclosure (SEC Act 
1933 and SEC Act 1934 Manual).  
 To ensure management compliance with the SEC Act requirements, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002 mandated Lehman Brothers senior management involved with financial reporting 
process (i.e. CEO, CFO) to review and sign periodic financial reports filed with SEC. By signing 
these reports,  the senior management acknowledged their responsibility in ensuring that the 
financial information provided was not misleading i.e. did not contain material misstatement 
and/or omit any information that could have a material impact on the firm’ future results and 
financial performance. Overall, the financial information provided reflected a true and fair 
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presentation of the Lehman Brothers financial condition for the periods reported (Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002, Section 302).  
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also mandated Lehman senior management to select, 
implement and maintain internal controls over financial reporting. In addition, the senior 
management were required to assess the effectiveness of these internal controls and report to 
Lehman external auditor and audit committee i) any weakness in the internal controls that may 
have a negative impact on the financial reporting process, ii) any significant changes that may 
have an impact on the internal controls and iii) any fraudulent activity regardless of its magnitude, 
that involved management or employees who had access to these internal controls (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002, Section 302 and 404(a)). 
 The senior management assertions and assessment of effectiveness of internal controls 
over financial reporting process were then required to be audited and attested by Lehman external 
auditor in accordance to the guidelines for attestation engagements provided by the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, Section 404(b)).  Under the 
auditing standard provision (AS5)
3
, Lehman external auditor was expected to i) exercise 
professional judgment in risk assessment and focus on areas that posed the highest risk, ii) scale 
the level of internal control testing to match the size and complexity of the company, iii) use risk-
based approach to determine to what extent he/she may rely on the work of others (Auditing 
Standard Provision Manual, AS5).    
 As in the case of all public traded companies and especially at the height of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, Lehman compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and SEC Act 
requirements, acted as a reassurance to investors that the financial information provided was a 
fair presentation of the financial condition of Lehman Brothers and that this information was 
reliable to make informed investment decisions. In the light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and 
SEC Act requirements and the circumstances surrounding Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the 
analysis of Lehman Brothers business environment, financial and management performance 
follows. 
                                                          
3
 The PCAOB’ AS5 was approved by the SEC in 2007 and become effective on November 15
th
 2007 and afterwards.  
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5.2 Analysis of Business Environment 
 Lehman like its business counterparties operated and conducted its business in a volatile 
environment that subjected its business operation and financial performance to both favorable 
and adverse market fluctuations (Lehman Brothers Annual Accounting report 2007; Valukas 
2010). To this extent Lehman management followed a low-risk brokerage business strategy that 
included acquiring assets for securitization
4
  (Valukas 2010). This ideal strategy mitigated 
Lehman exposure to the subprime and commercial mortgage business should there be a downturn 
of markets. In addition, Lehman established appropriate risk management structure, internal 
controls and monitoring devices (Lehman Brothers Annual Accounting report 2007).  
 The risk management structure consisted of separation of duties between the risk 
management, revenue generation and management oversight of risk management function 
(Lehman Brothers Annual Accounting report 2007). Consistent with Valukas (2010) findings, 
Lehman risk management committee (i.e. selected senior management members, head of risk 
management and executive committee) had established risk management policies and risk limits 
to mitigate risk exposure associated with market, credit, liquidity and reputation risks. In addition, 
the risk management committee was responsible to allocate capital to each business units and 
establish trading and credit limits for counterparties in order to maintain diversified business 
operations (Lehman Brothers Annual Accounting report 2007). 
 The risk management committee met on weekly basis or as needed to discuss and assess 
Lehman risk exposure, position concentration and risk taking activities and to take the 
appropriate actions to mitigate these risks (Lehman Brothers Annual Accounting report 2007). 
However, in 2006, Lehman Brothers adopted an aggressive growth strategy that later become its 
seed of destruction. The strategy encouraged high leverage and rewarded risk taking behavior. In 
particular Lehman used its capital to acquire long-term investments (i.e. commercial real estate, 
leverage lending and private-equity), hence increasing its opportunities to earn significant returns 
from these investments.  
                                                          
4
 Securitization is the art of combining different financial instrument (i.e. mortgage-backed assets) into one large 
pool and then dividing the pool into small pieces also known as tranches. The small pieces/tranches are then 
repackaged according to the level of risk of default and sold to investors based on investor’s risk appetite. 
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 Lehman pursuit of growth opportunities was not a new phenomenon within the financial 
services industry.  This can be explained by the fact that financial institutions unlike other 
business entities adjust their balance sheet according to market fluctuations (Greenlaw et al 2008; 
Adrian and Shin 2008). This means that as financial asset prices increases, a financial institution 
will increase its leverage (i.e. borrow funds and use the proceedings to invest in securities) such 
that it maintains a constant leverage ratio. Hence, Lehman short-term borrowing and long term 
investment can be seen as a way of adjusting balance sheet to reflect the market condition. 
However, investing in leverage lending, commercial real estate and private-equity exposed 
Lehman to greater business risk than its traditional business operations, because of the 
uncertainty in liquidity nature of these investments (Valukas 2010). 
 During the onset of the mortgage financial crises till July 2007, Lehman aggressively 
continued to invest in mortgage assets (Valukas 2010). This was contrary to the normal 
expectation of financial institutions’ behavior because as financial assets prices declined, Lehman 
reaction should have been to sell some of its security inventory and pay off some of its short-term 
financial obligations in order adjust its balance sheet and maintain a constant leverage ratio 
(Greenlaw et al 2008).The miscalculated business judgment  was as a result of management 
belief that i) the subprime crisis was containable and ii) Lehman Brothers had the opportunity to 
strengthen its competitive position and actually benefit from the subprime lending crisis as other 
financial institutions exited the market or reduced their risk exposure (Valukas 2010). This 
increased Lehman holdings in illiquid mortgage assets from $ 87 billion in 2006 to $175 billion 
at the end of the first quarter of 2008 as the market of these assets continued to deteriorate 
(Valukas 2010; Dutta et al 2012). 
  Increased holdings in illiquid mortgage assets coupled with credit agency and market 
participants’ demand for investment banks to reduce their leverage ratios or face a credit down 
rating exerted pressure on Lehman management (Valukas 2010). This was because Lehman daily 
operations depended on the short-term funding raised in the repo markets. To raise enough short-
term capital required Lehman to continuously maintain the confidence of its counterparties which 
exclusively depended on its credit rating (Lehman Brothers Annual Accounting report 2007; 
Valukas 2010). Lehman senior management had therefore every incentive to manage Lehman’s 
balance sheet and avoid down grading of the firm’s credit rating. 
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 However, the senior management was unwilling to obtain needed funds through issue of 
new stock because an announcement of new equity issue is positively associated with dilution of 
existing stock prices (Myers and Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986; Valukas 2010). Low stock prices 
would decrease Lehman’s market value hence affect the wealth of the existing shareholders 
(Myers and Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986).  Second, the low demand for mortgage-backed financial 
products made it difficult for Lehman Brothers to find a ready market to sell these assets without 
incurring a loss. Selling at a loss (i.e. discounted prices) would result to a negative effect on the 
overall firm performance and increase loss of investors’ confidence on Lehman’s valuation 
remaining assets (Valukas 2010).  
 Because of these negative implications, Lehman, pressured to reduce leverage, increased 
its Repo 105 “sales” transactions normally near the end of each quarter. The objective of the 
transactions was to i) temporary remove security assets on Lehman’s balance sheet, ii) borrow 
short-finances without recording a liability and iii) reduce leverage ratio on its balance sheet, 
hence lower its net leverage ratio and avoid down grading of its  credit rating(Valukas 2010). 
However this raises some interesting questions i.e. one, why did Lehman increasingly rely on its 
Repo 105 “sales” transactions when it had a proven record of increasing profits each year over 
period of five consecutive years? And two, was Lehman’s financial condition as healthy as its 
financial statements especially the balance sheet and income statement portrayed?   
5.2.1 Financial Performance Analysis 
 In general financial information provided in financial statements of a business corporation 
ought to serve as a key indicator of financial performance of its business operations. Nevertheless, 
strong balance and income statements results may not necessary reveal an entity’s liquidity or 
ability to meet its future financial obligation. Lehman, for a period of five consecutive years, 
2003-2007, reported positive growth and an increase in net income in its financial statements 
(Lehman Brothers Annual Reports 2005; 2006; 2007). 
 However, Lehman’s heavily reliance on Repo 105 “sales” transactions to reduce its net 
leverage ratio was a clear indication that the firm was experiencing difficulty in adjusting its 
balance sheet to reflect market conditions (Valukas 2010).This can be explained by the fact that 
Lehman adoption of its aggressive business model left it highly leveraged and therefore Lehman 
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was extremely exposed to market risk given the large holdings in illiquid assets in its balance 
sheet. Research studies show that firms that are highly leveraged most of the time even though 
they may earn significant returns are likely to experience financial distress in the event of losses 
arising from market, credit or liquidity risks since the firms do not have enough capital to absorb 
these losses (Andrade and Kaplan 1997; Opler and Titman 1994).  
 In analyzing Lehman’s financial performance, the statement of cash flow is used. 
 
a) The Statement of Cash Flow Analysis 
 
 Although there has been a long standing debate in regards to the usefulness of the 
financial information in the statement of cashflow (Barton et al 2010; Kumar and 2008; Akbar et 
al 2011), market participants still continue to rely on this information to understand a business 
entity’s cash inflow and outflow activities in order to assess its financial and liquidity position 
(FAS 95 Accounting Manual; Grier 2007; Maux and Morin, 2011 ).However, analyzing the 
statement of cash flow for financial institutions is usually limited  because of off-balance sheet 
arrangements and differences in activities (i.e. financial institutions view cash as a “product” of 
its earning activities the same way as a traditional firm views its finished goods). This makes the 
statement of cash flow information to seem less informative and perhaps is often overlooked 
compared to that of manufacturing companies. 
  In spite of the differences in activities, financial institutions like the manufacturing 
companies need to generate net positive cashflow for their long-run survival (FAS 95 Accounting 
Manual). The statement of cashflow can therefore be seen as a valid financial document that 
contains informative information which combined with other information in relation to market 
condition and firm business prospects can be vital in assess financial institutions exposure to 
operational risks (Catanach 2000; FAS 95 Accounting Manual).  
 The analysis of Lehman’s statement of cashflow is carried out over a period of five years 
to track down any significant changes in Lehman’s operations, financing and investment 
activities. The aim of the analysis is to assess if the information provided in the statement of cash 
flow was informative enough to detect any warning signs in connection to Lehman’s financial 
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and liquidity condition prior to its bankruptcy. In addition, Lehman’s free cash flow is computed 
using Lehman’s annual financial statements filed with SEC. 
 Exhibit 5.2.1 summarizes financial data taken from net income, statement of cashflow and the 
free cash flow results. 
Exhibit 5.2.1: Data from Lehman Financial Statements and Free Cash Flow 
 
 In Million (Net) nov.03 nov.04 nov.05 nov.06 nov.07 
Net Income 1,649 2,369 3,260 4,007 4,192 
Cash Flow  From Operations 1,896 -13,570 -12,205 -36,376 -45,998 
Cash Flow From Investments -1,108 -531 -447 -792 -1,698 
Cash Flow From Financing 3,435  11,619 12,112  38,255 48,592  
      
Free Cash Flow       
Operating cash flow 
 
2,393 3,260 3,960 4,192 
Change in NWC 
 
13,436 13,489 34,976 51,572 
Change in fixed assets at cost   608 325 898 1,169 
Free Cash Flow (FCF)   -11,651 -10,554 -31,914 -48,549 
Financial figures were obtain from Lehman’s financial statements attached in the Appendix 
*Operating cash flow was computed as a sum of net income and depreciation plus net change in interest income multiplied 
by 1 minus corporate tax rate.  
*Change in NWC is computed by subtracting difference in current year current liabilities and previous year current 
liabilities from the difference current year current assets – previous year current asset. 
*change in fixed assets at cost is computed by subtracting prior year net fixed assets from the sum of current year net 
fixed assets and depreciation. 
*FCF is computed by subtracting change in net working capital and change in fixed assets at cost from operating 
cashflows. 
 
 
 Positive cash flow from operations is always a positive sign of financial condition of a 
firm than when it is negative (Grier, 2007). Lehman, over four consecutive years reported net 
cash deficit from its operations activities. This was not unusual since financial institutions from 
time to time have reported negative cashflow from their operations because of the differences in 
their daily activities.  The greatest concern, however, was the rapid increase in cash deficit for the 
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two years prior to its bankruptcy given the fact that Lehman had highly invested in assets whose 
market condition was deteriorating (Valukas 2010). In addition, the computation results of 
Lehman’s free cash flow are negative over the four consecutive years and increase by an average 
of 127% for the two years prior to bankruptcy.  
 An increased in negative net cashflow from operation activities and lack of financial 
“slack”  (i.e. free cashflow) meant that Lehman had to increase its reliance on short and long-
term borrowings to offset the cash deficit and raise enough capital to sustain its operation 
activities (Myers and Majluf 1984). This explains the rapid increase in net cashflow from 
financing activities.  
 Raising capital through short or long-term debt was the norm for financial institutions and 
therefore was expected of Lehman. However, as discussed in this paper, financial institutions 
usually reduce their debt position during market downturn as a way to manage their balance sheet 
and hence reduce their exposure to losses due to decline in security assets (Greenlaw et al 2008). 
Lehman, however, seemed to increase its dependence on debt rather than reduce its exposure. 
Perhaps an indication of high likelihood of exposure to risks associated with financial distress 
(Andrade and Kaplan 1997; Opler and Titman 1994).  
d) Financial Analysis Conclusion Remarks 
 Given the limitation of the statement of cash flow analysis because of the differences in 
financial institutions’ business operation structures in comparison to traditional business firms, 
the results are inadequate in gauging Lehman’s financial condition on a stand-alone basis. 
However, incorporating the results with other factors such as the level of leverage exhibited by 
Lehman, risks associated with high concentration in mortgage investments and the market 
condition for these investments, the results do indicate some significant warning signs in regards 
to Lehman’s financial condition but perhaps not strong enough to raise concerns among markets 
participants because of the following reasons.  
 First, in comparing Lehman statement of cash flows with comparable financial 
institutions (i.e. Goldman Sachs & Morgan Stanley), the same trend is observed i.e. an increase in 
reported cash deficit from operations and increase in positive cash flow from financing for the 
years 2006 and 2007, two years prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy. Second, financial analysts and 
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market participants paid extreme attention to the balance sheet and income statement figures of 
financial institutions in connection to financial health assessment (Maux and Morin, 2011).In 
addition, looking at the information provided in Lehman’s balance sheet and income statement, 
there was not enough disclosure for investors to “guess estimate” Lehman’s losses in connection 
to mortgage business (Einhorn 2008; Valukas 2010). 
 Third, Lehman projected positive and increasing net income results, paid dividends and 
had the ability to meet its investments and financial obligations in a timely manner (Lehman 
Brothers Annual Report 2007).  And finally, high leverage was the norm for financial institutions 
and the risks were not apparent because of high liquidity in the market. When returns are high, 
risks are perceived less costly than they actual are, and unfortunately, “as long as the music is 
playing in terms of liquidity”, capital market participants tend to “get up and dance” (Chuck Price, 
Citibank CEO; Nakomato and Wignton 2007). 
5.2.3 Analysis of Lehman Management Performance 
 The decision to adopt aggressive business model and to continue with risky investment in 
spite of market deterioration for these investments created conditions for Lehman management to: 
a) Exceed the Firm Risk Appetite Limits 
 Initially, Lehman risk management committee had established various internal controls in 
connection with its investments concentration and use of “Repo 105” transactions (Valukas 2010).  
The internal controls included but were not limited to the firm risk appetite limits (Valukas 
2010).However, in the period between 2006 and prior to its bankruptcy; Lehman management 
constantly exceeded these limits. For instance, an increase in commercial, real estate and leverage 
loans investments violated both the risk management policies and exceeded the firm’s 
concentration limits (Valukas 2010).  Evidence from emails collected and interviews conducted 
by the Bank examiner revealed that the senior management ignored the counsel of their own risk 
management personnel (Valukas 2010).   
 Key employees opposed to Lehman risk management practices and risky investment were 
often sidelined or replaced with willing employees. For example, in 2007, Lehman Chief Risk 
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Officer, Madelyn Antoncic
5was replaced by Chris O’Meara (CFO) who had very little experience 
in risk management but was an experienced chief financial officer (Valukas 2010; Stanton 2012) 
and Michael Gelband, head of fixed Income Division, was replaced by London-based Roger 
Nagioff who later retired seven months before Lehman Bankruptcy (Maclean and Pettifor 2008; 
Mathiason et al 2009; Valukas 2010).  
 Replacement of experienced risk management personnel with less experienced ones 
serves as a signal of weakness in corporate governance and creates an opportunity to harbor 
fraudulent activities. As an investment bank operating in volatile business environment where 
securities prices are affected by daily market fluctuation, identifying, evaluating and managing 
risk exposures is of vital importance for the survival of the firm (Lehman Brothers Annual Report 
2007; Stulz 2008; Valukas 2010). In addition, although the ultimate decision to undertake 
investments with known risks rests on the senior management, a firm needs experienced risk 
management personnel to be able to understand these risks and clearly communicate them to the 
senior management. This assists the senior management to make informed decisions to undertake 
investments that do not exceed the risk appetite limit set by the firm (Stulz 2008; Valukas 2010)             
b)  Rely on Repo “105” Transactions  
 Exceeding the firm risk appetite limits led Lehman management to undertake large 
investments whose liquidity was uncertain because of the changes in markets conditions for these 
investments (Valukas 2010). This had an effect in its profitability as the firm experienced 
declines in securitization business revenue (Valukas 2010).  At the same time because of pressure 
to reduce its balance sheet holdings and leverage ratios Lehman significantly increased its Repo 
use especially in the period between 2007 and 2008. 
 In general, Lehman financial accounting systems were designed to treat all repo as 
financing transactions and therefore Repo 105 reclassified as “sales” were manually changed. 
This perhaps helped ensure that only financial securities that were marketable and qualified as 
investment grades (i.e. securities that were graded as A or triple A types) were used in the Repo 
                                                          
5
 Madelyne Antoncic is an experienced risk manager and currently works as the vice-president and treasurer in 
World Bank. 
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“sales” and that the firm wide use of “Repo 105” transactions did not exceed the internal firm 
limit(Valukas 2010).  
 However, evidence from documents and email correspondence indicated that 
management exceeded the internal imposed limits for the sole purpose of window dressing 
(Valukas 2010).  For instance, in an email correspondence, Bart McDade then President and 
Chief Operating Officer when asked if he knew that the main purpose for Repo transactions was 
to reduce the net balance sheet. He replied, “I am very aware…it is another drug we r on” 
(Valukas 2010). Interestingly, further evidenced showed Repo 105 transactions significantly 
increased days before each quarter-end (Valukas 2010). For example, in August 2007, the Repo 
transactions amounted to $36.4 billion. In September and October the Repo amounts declined to 
$24.4 and $29.4 billion respectively. However, in November the amount increased again to $38.6 
billion. This trend was observed in Lehman first and second quarter of 2008 and the Repo 
transactions at the end of the two quarters had significantly increased and amounted to $49.1 and 
$50.4 billion respectively (Valukas 2010). 
 The use of Repo “105” transactions would have been legitimate if the transactions were 
business motivated. However, restrictions on Repo “105” transactions use, plus the fact that the 
amount of transactions spiked towards the quarter ends proved that the transactions were only 
used to help Lehman obtained its leverage ratios through balance sheet management.    
c)  Use Questionable Risk Assessment Methods  
 Lehman risk assessment, monitoring and management were conducted using different risk 
measurements tools which included the VaR and stress tests (Lehman Annual Report 20017; 
Valukas 2010). In general, risk measurements tools depend on information gathered and therefore 
the results obtained can be biased as a result of mistakes in information gathering, excluding of 
known and unknown risks and other important market assumptions (Stulz 2008). 
 Obtaining biased results may lead a firm to undertake risks that exceed a firm risk appetite. 
This can results to large losses in adverse market conditions. For example, if a firm assesses risk 
using either stress or daily VaR, and finds that undertaking a certain investment may result to  a 
95%  chance of gaining 12% in returns or  5% chance of a losing  2million, depending on the 
firm’s ability to absorb losses, this may turn out to be a good investment. However, if the results 
43 
  
are biased and the true estimates are 80% chance of gaining 15% in returns and 20% chance of 
losing 4 million, the firm, even though it has a chance of earning a higher return on the 
investments, is greatly exposed to risk associated with financial distress since it may not have the 
ability to absorb a loss of 4million. 
 Lehman risk assessment tests included only its trading positions (i.e. marketable securities, 
stocks), but not its real estate investments, private equity and leverage loans commitments 
because these assets were not freely traded (Valukas 2010). This meant that Lehman had no 
overview of the risk exposures associated with these investments. Without a proper overview of 
the risk exposures, it was difficult for the firm to adhere to its risk appetite limits and therefore 
continued to undertake investments that resulted to large losses at the peak of the financial crisis.  
 Interestingly, experimental stress tests conducted in 2008 that included the real estate 
investments, private equity and leverage loans commitments revealed that 79% of Lehman 
potential risk losses or about $7.4 billion lay with the excluded positions and only 21% or $2.0 
billion was attributed to trading positions (Valukas 2010). 
d) Inadequate Disclosed its Valuation Techniques 
 In the first quarter of 2007, Lehman adopted the SFAS 157 and valued its financial 
instruments and other inventory positions owned at fair value (Lehman Brothers Annual Report 
2007). The SFAS 157 provision guidelines made it possible for financial institutions to categorize 
their financial instruments under three levels: i) Level I type of assets were mostly marketable 
securities (i.e. stocks traded in active markets, governmental and agency securities) and were 
valued at quoted prices available in financial markets (Lehman Annual Report 2007; Valukas 
2010). ii) Level II type of assets were financial instruments and inventory positions (i.e. as non-
govemental securities and certain mortgage asset backed securities) whose prices were not 
directly observable. However, these prices were easily estimated using available historical data 
and valuation models (Lehman Brothers Annual Report 2007).  And finally, iii)  Level type of 
assets consisted of financial instruments that were rarely traded hence prices were not easily 
obtained and therefore valuation of these assets depended on management best estimates based 
on its assumption of what market participants would use to price these assets (Lehman Annual 
Report 2007; Valukas 2010). 
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 At the height of financial crisis and adverse market conditions most of the mortgage 
backed-assets had become illiquid and valuation of these assets depended on management 
judgment to determine the correct fair value (Valukas 2010). Lehman had in its possession a pool 
of large illiquid investments and accordingly reclassified most of these assets as level III (i.e. in 
mid-2007, about $11.4 billion of its mortgage and asset-backed securities in addition to $5.3 
billion in US subprime residential mortgage assets were to move to Level III). And by the end of 
2007 fiscal year, half of Lehman residential mortgage assets classified as level III were whole 
mortgage loans (Lehman Brothers Annual Report 2007). 
 However, in beginning of 2008, when information used to value some of these mortgage 
backed-assets become apparent and some of the financial institutions began to recognized losses, 
Lehman was slow in reclassify  some its level III assets and did not recognize losses on a timely 
manner  (Einhorn 2008). This resulted to market participants questioning Lehman valuation 
techniques. For example, David Einhorn, a hedge fund manager, sorted explanation of “Lehman 
justification of $200 million write downs on $6.5 billion pool of CDOs that included $1.6 billion 
of below investment grades pieces when market prices of comparable structured products had 
declined in value” (Einhorn 2008).  
  In addition, Lehman disclosures were sometime inadequate or misleading. For example, 
David Einhorn, skeptical of Lehman disclosure in connection to “large write up in level III 
corporate equities and Lehman ability to make a profit of $722million on 8.4 billion portfolios in 
a period when the S&P had declined by 10%” decided to countercheck the information with other 
sources. Surprisingly, the explanation offered by Lehman during the earnings conference did not 
match the information gathered by David Einhorn (Einhorn 2008).   
 Apparently, during the conference call, Callan, Lehman then CFO had indicated that in 
February, Lehman had completed a profitable pre-IPO round. However, David found out that in 
November 2005, Lehman Brothers had made initial investment of $112 million in KSK 
Electricity Financing. Later, in January 2008, KSK Electricity Financing completed its 
restructuring process and Lehman sold its investment for a gain of $65million. In addition, 
Lehman Brothers purchased KSK Energy Ventures shares for $86.5 million resulting to a third 
ownership of KSK Energy Ventures (Einhorn 2008).   
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 Because of lack of transparency and inconsistences in Lehman disclosures, market 
participants increasingly lost confidence in Lehman reported assets values, resulting to constant 
decline in stock prices (Einhorn 2008; Valukas 2010).   
 5.3 Auditor Responsibility under the GAAS Guidelines 
 As Lehman external auditor, Ernst and Young‘s objective was to restore the confidence of 
market participants in the financial information provided by Lehman. To achieve this, Ernst and 
Young was expected to express an opinion over financial statements, that is to affirm if the 
information provided in Lehman financial statements presented a fair picture of the financial 
condition of the firm and if the statements were prepared in accordance to acceptable accounting 
framework i.e. US GAAP (Au Section 110, 02- Auditing Standard Provision Manual). In 
addition, Ernst and Young expected to assess and attest the effectiveness of Lehman internal 
controls over financial reporting process (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, Section 404(b)).   
 To effectively conduct its audit engagements, Ernst and Young was expected to compile 
with the applicable audit guidelines set by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB). This included but was not limited to: 
a) Appointing Audit Engagement Team (AU 110, 10) 
  In selecting and assigning an audit engagement team Ernst and Young was expected to 
bear in mind the complexity of Lehman’s business operations and uncertainty of its business 
environment (Lehman Brothers Annual Report 2007). Given the fact that auditor knowledge and 
experience has a direct impact on the level of  audit quality (Bonner 1990), it was extremely 
important for Ernst and Young to assign a competent team for all Lehman audit engagements (Au 
Section 110, 04- Auditing Standard Provision Manual).  
b) Independence and Due Professional Care (AU 220-230) 
  The Auditing standard AU 220 requires that an auditor or audit team to be independent 
during all its audit engagements.  This ensures that auditor judgment is not impaired and he or 
she is able to make impartial judgment and decisions. If the auditor is not independent or 
perceived not independent then the objective of external audits (i.e. to restore the confidence of 
market participants in the information provided in financial statements) is compromised. 
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  As Lehman external auditor, Ernst and Young engagement team was required to ensure 
that it remained independent during all its audit engagements. In addition, the team had to plan 
and carry out its audit engagement with due professional care.  This meant that the team had to 
exercise high levels of professional skepticism  in all areas of the audit engagement (i.e. gathering 
and evaluating audit evidence) in order, for example, be able to detect  financial misstatements  if 
any (Bernardi 1994; Knechel et al. 2012 )  and  perform additional procedures when deemed  
necessary( Shaub and Lawrence 1996).   
c) Consideration of Fraud in Financial Statement Audit (AU 316) 
 One of the major concerns when it came to Lehman financial statements was the 
possibility that the information provide in its financial statement did not reflect the true picture of 
the financial health of the firm.  As Lehman external auditor, Ernst and Young was expected to 
assess this information to ensure that it was presented in an accurate manner and prepared in 
accordance to the USGAAP accounting framework (Stuart 2010). 
 To effectively and efficiently achieve this objective, Ernst and Young needed to 
understand and evaluate Lehman business environment. This included but was not limited to 
understanding internal controls over financial reporting process to determine their effectiveness 
in preventing or detecting financial misstatements (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, Section 404(b)).  . 
Second, it was important for Ernst and Young to make note of any significant changes in 
economic or business trend.  For example, the year 2007 marked the beginning of decline in the 
mortgage business operations and by mid-2007, it had already developed to a financial crisis 
(Hördahl and King 2008). This significant economic and business change had a huge impact on 
Lehman profitability, since 64% of its revenue was generated through the fixed income business 
segment (Lehman Brother Annual Report 2007; Valukas 2010). 
 Third, Ernst and Young needed to identify and focus on areas that posed the highest risk. 
In this case, Lehman’s areas of highest risks given the market conditions were valuation of assets, 
recognition of losses in relation to mortgage crisis and Repo “105” transactions. The Repo “105” 
transactions posed significant risks since recognition of these transactions had direct impact on 
Lehman leverage ratio. In addition, Lehman was facing a lot of pressure from market participants 
and credit ratings to reduce leverage ratio or face down grading of its credit rating (Valukas 
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2010).  Lehman there for had very strong incentives to ensure that it met the market participants 
and crediting rating expectations. Repo “105” transactions offered the best solution because it 
was technically a legitimate way of raising capital. However, it also provided potential means to 
conceal fraud. 
 Finally, based on Ernst and Young understanding and assessment of Lehman business 
operations and environment, the engagement team needed to gather “sufficient appropriate” 
evidence in order to provide a reasonable assurance of the Lehman financial condition i.e. by 
expressing an opinion over Lehman’s financial statements ( AU Section, 01-02). 
5.3.2 Overview of Ernst and Young Defense  
 Following Lehman bankruptcy, the United States Bankruptcy Court, New York appointed 
an Examiner to carry out an investigation in order to establish the causes that led to Lehman 
failure (Valukas 2010).  During the investigation process, the Examiner became aware of 
Lehman’s Repo 105 transactions. Further investigation revealed that the purpose of Lehman repo 
“105” was not business motivated but a way for Lehman to manage its balance sheet. Evidence 
collected revealed that Repo 105 transactions increased in volumes during the period between 
2006 and 2008 (Valukas 2010). 
 Based on further investigation in relation to Repo 105 transaction use, the Examiner 
concluded that there was “colorable claims that existed against Ernst and Young” for failure to i) 
adhere to auditing standards in the process of auditing and reviewing Lehman end reports and 
quarterly reports filed with the Security Exchange Council (SEC), and ii) investigate the 
whistleblower claim and communicate with Lehman’s Audit Committee (Valukas 2010). 
 As a result Ernst and Young faced litigation charges both in UK and in the US. In June 
2012, following  an 18-month investigations, Accounting and Actuarial Discipline Board, UK 
(AADB)  dropped the charges against Ernst and Young and concluded “ there was no realistic 
prospect that a tribunal would make an adverse finding against Ernst and Young or any partners 
and staff” ( Irvine 2012; Shotter 2010). The decision was based on the fact that the Examiner 
report did not specify if the colorable claims applied to Ernst and Young in the US or in general 
( Treanor 2012). However, Ernst and Young, New York litigation case was moved from federal 
court to the New York State Court (Dye 2012; Shotter 2012). Early December 2012, Judge Oing 
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ruled in favor of Ernst and Young.  However, Ernst and Young still face possible lawsuit, should 
the New York attorney general choose to pursue investors’ damages and restitutions against Ernst 
and Young (Freifeld 2012).   
 In view of the Examiner report and the outcome of Ernst and Young litigations, the 
analysis discussion follows and a conclusion is made.  
5.3.3 Ernst and Young Performance Analysis 
 The discussion below is motivated by the problem statement posed in the beginning of 
this paper, that is to what extent  i) are auditors responsible for failing to identify fraudulent  
financial statement and ii) do financial standards contribute to audit failure?  To offer a 
concrete conclusion in regards to Ernst and Young auditing engagement, it is important to bear in 
mind some practical considerations.   
 First and foremost, Ernst and Young as an external auditor was required to provide a 
reasonable assurance that Lehman’s financial presentations were not misstated. Provision of an 
assurance (i.e. auditor opinion) is normally based on some professional judgment (AU Section 
230). However, professional judgment is also in part influenced by the level of auditor 
knowledge and expertise (Knechel et al. 2012) and therefore it is likely in some cases that 
mistakes (i.e. auditor fails to detect a misstatement) will occur. In this case, it is important to 
consider if the auditor in conducting the audit engagement adhered to the auditing guidelines 
provided by PCAOB. If the auditor conducted the engagement as required by the auditing 
standards then other factors should also be considered (i.e. unforeseeable future economic 
changes, fraud concealed by senior management, accounting standards ambiguity etc). 
 Second, when assessing the financial statements an auditor is required to check if the 
information is prepared in accordance to the applicable accounting guidelines. In this case Ernst 
was required to ensure that Lehman financial statements were prepared in accordance to the 
USGAAP. Unfortunately, not all accounting standards provide clear-cut guidelines. In such cases, 
the interpretation of the accounting standards will depend on management’s judgment and 
sometimes the work of an expert. If such a situation arises, an auditor using his or her 
professional judgment can choose to rely on the work of an expert (AU Section 336). The most 
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important is to ensure that the interpretation of such accounting standards still maintain the 
fairness and truthfulness of financial statements. 
 Finally, during an audit engagement and even after the audit engagement, an auditor may 
become aware of some information that could have an impact on his or her decision (i.e. a 
whistleblower letter, discovery of fraudulent activity etc).  The auditor in this case is required to 
use some professional judgment when assessing the information at hand. If there is strong 
indication that the contents of the information are valid, then the auditor should deal with the 
issues raised.  
 For example, in May 2008, Ernst and Young received a copy of the whistleblower’s letter. 
The letter was addressed to Lehman senior financial management and highlighted different 
accounting irregularities in connection to Lehman financial statements. These allegations were 
serious since they indicated that there was possibility of fraudulent activity. Accordingly, 
William Schlich and Hillary Hansen, Ernst and Young auditors interviewed Lee in connection to 
the letter. After gathering information, it was upon Ernst and Young auditors to use their 
professional judgment in deciding if the issues raised were supported by strong evidence to be 
dealt with and disclosed in the second quarter or not. In such cases, it may be difficult to prove 
that the auditor was negligent on a stand-alone basis. However, other factors can be considered to 
determine if the auditor was indeed negligent or lacked sufficient audit evidence to base his 
decision. 
 In analyzing Ernst and Young performance, first the allegations are assessed using the 
above criteria to make a conclusion if Ernst and Young failed to identify fraudulent activity at 
Lehman and/or financial standards contribute to audit failure.   
a) Repo “105” transactions and Expert Letter issues 
  Ernst and Young was accused for not adhering to auditing standards in the process of 
auditing and reviewing Lehman end reports and quarterly reports filed with the Security 
Exchange Council (SEC). This allegation was connected with Ernst and Young allowing Lehman 
to use the Repo “105”, thus Ernst and Young was seen as enabling Lehman to hind its true 
financial conditions from its investors (Valukas 2010).  
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 The main objective of Ernst and Young as discussed above was to provide an opinion in 
regards to Lehman financial statements. This opinion is a reasonable and not an absolute 
assurance that Lehman financial statements were free from misstatement either arising from 
errors or fraud. Since this opinion is based on some professional judgment which in part is 
influenced by an auditor knowledge and expertise (Knechel et al. 2012) and partly by other 
factors, it is possible to argue that there was a fair chance that mistakes could occur. This is also 
applicable to when all the accounting standards are followed.   
 Other factors to be put into consideration in this case were economic factors that were 
affecting Lehman business operations as well as other financial and business corporations. These 
economic factors could in fact make audit quality seem poor since many financial institutions that 
received clean opinions did go bankrupt a few months after the issuance of clean audit opinions 
(Sikka et al. 2009). Second, because of interconnectedness of financial institutions it is possible 
that even health financial institutions would become insolvent as result of failure in one financial 
institution. 
 The second part of the objective was to ensure that Lehman financial statements were 
prepared in accordance to USGAAP. In this case, the question at hand is if Ernst and Young by 
approving Lehman’s use of the “Repo 105” transactions was in violation of the USGAAP.  Based 
on the evidence collected by the Examiner, the Repo “105” transactions were technically 
legitimate transactions and they complied with provision of the existing accounting standard (i.e.  
SFAS 140) at that time.  The SFAS 140 in part provided Lehman senior management the 
opportunity to use professional judgment in deciding when Repo “105” transactions met the 
criteria to be reclassified as sales and not financing. In addition, as discussed in this paper, 
Lehman management ensured that the transactions met the necessary requirements under the 
SFAS 140 provision criteria (Valukas 2010). It is therefore fair to conclude that on a stand-alone 
basis, Ernst and Young by approving the “Repo 105” did follow the GAAS guideline.  
 The auditing standard AU 336 provides guidelines on when to rely on the work of an 
expert. In addition, the auditor is required to exercise professional skepticism and judgment when 
deciding to what extent he or she will rely on the work of an expert. In this case, Ernst and Young, 
New York needed to exercise professional skepticism when deciding to review the Linklaters 
letter of “true “sale opinion. However, the transactions were basically taking place in the UK and 
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under the UK law, Lehman transactions were legitimate (Valukas 2010). We can therefore fairly 
conclude that Ernst and Young, London audited Lehman Brothers, London in accordance to the 
applicable auditing guidelines. Here we have to also remember that some rules that were 
applicable in UK may not have been applicable in the US and therefore this was a matter of 
auditor using his or her judgment based on the audit evidence at hand.  
b) Some “Red Flags”  
 However, there were some “red flags” that raises questions in regards to Ernst and Young 
feasibility in dealing with the possibility of fraudulent activity at Lehman. First and foremost, 
Lehman began to use Repo “105” transactions as early as 2001 and increased the volume of the 
transactions in the beginning of 2006 through mid-2008. Evidently, these transactions did not 
have a legitimate business purpose but were used for balance sheet management (Valukas 2010).  
 Arguable, the balance sheet management or in this case window dressing has long been 
part of the financial industry and in most cases when window dressing, financial institutions are 
not in violation of applicable accounting framework. However, if window dressing in fact has a 
material effect on the firm financial health, it should be disclosed in the financial statements. 
Failure to disclose the effect of the window dressing is then a violation of the accounting 
framework.  
 From the perspective that Lehman used the Repo “105” as a balance sheet management 
tool, it was therefore important that Lehman disclosed its Repo “105” use because it had an 
impact on the leverage ratios (Valukas 2010) and therefore failure to disclose was in fact 
misleading the investors to believe that Lehman financial health was good when it was not. This 
meant that market participants based their investment decisions on misleading financial 
information (Valukas 2010).  
 Furthermore, in September 2006, Bharat Jain, Ernst and Young auditor, raised concerns in 
regards to Lehman use of Repo “105” transactions and potential reputation risks associated with 
these transactions (Lattman 2010). Later, between late 2007 and early 2008, Kelly Martin, 
Lehman Global Financial Controller from December 2007 to September 2008, became 
uncomfortable with the increase volume of Repo “105” transactions and raised his concerns with 
Callan, then the Lehman CFO as well as with  William Schlich, Ernst and Young partner. His 
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main concerns were the i) legitimate use of the Linklaters letter given fact that Lehman could not 
obtain a true sale opinion in the US, ii) potential reputation risks associated with the Repo “105” 
transactions, given the fact that none of  Lehman competitors used the same accounting method 
( Valukas 2010). Lastly, the same concerns were raised by Lee, Lehman senior vice-president in 
finance division and whistleblower, during his interview with Ernst and Young. 
 In all the three occasions, there was no follow up and it seemed that Ernst and Young was 
comfortable with Lehman use of Repo “105” transactions. However, the fact that use of the Repo 
“105” transactions raised concerns in regards to Lehman “reputation risks” indicated that it was a 
potential risk factor especially in the height of the financial crisis and Ernst and Young should 
have further investigated to determine if Lehman excess use of Repo “105” transactions was in 
violation of the USGAAP.  
c) Auditor’s Analysis Conclusion Remarks  
  When each allegation is taken as an isolated case, there is strong evidence that Ernst and 
Young did technically compile with the auditing guidelines. However, when the allegations are 
taken as a whole there is strong evidence to question Ernst and Young capability in dealing with 
possibility of fraudulent activity at Lehman. 
 I argued that Ernst and Young failure to discover potential fraudulent activity was partly 
contributed by the ambiguity in the accounting standards which may have in part biased the 
auditors’ judgment and decision process. In addition, given the fact that Ernst and Young 
approved Lehman accounting policy it perhaps made it challenging for Ernst and Young to 
confront Lehman management when the use of Repo “105” transactions escalated.    
6.  Summary 
 This paper was aimed at evaluating the role of external audits  in financial institutions 
with the aim of finding the answer to the questions posed in the beginning of this paper i.e. to 
what extent  are auditors responsible for failing to identify fraudulent  financial statement and  
do financial standards contribute to audit failure?  The case of Lehman brothers was used to 
evaluate Lehman’s external auditor Ernst and Young performance. The results indicate that Ernst 
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and Young failure to discover potential fraudulent activity was partly contributed by the 
ambiguity in the accounting standards, perhaps, indicating a case of unconscious bias.  
  
 The analysis of Ernst and Young is based on the available information and data collected 
from the Examiner report, Lehman Financial statements and news articles from different business 
websites. The results are limited because of unavailable inputs from the auditor side (i.e. report 
from auditor’s working papers and other important information). 
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8. Appendix 
To demonstrate the Examiner’s simplified balance sheet is used with an assumption that Lehman 
Brothers receives $100 million cash from its repo transactions.  Gross and net leverage are 
computed as total assets divided by stockholders’ equity and total assets minus collateralized 
agreements divided by stockholders’ equity respectively (Valukas 2010).  
Exhibit 3 shows the calculation of the gross and net leverage ratios before undertaking Repo 
transactions. 
Exhibit 3 : Leverage Ratios Before Undertaking Repo Transactions 
 
Assets 
 
Liabilities 
Cash     7,500 Short Term financing 200,000 
Financial Instruments  300,000 Collateralized Financings 275,000 
Collateralized Agreements 350,000 Long term Debt 150,000 
Account Receivables 
Other  Current liabilities 
Total 
Gross Leverage  
Net Leverage 
  20,000 
 72,500 
750,000 
     28 
    15 
 Account Payable 
Stockholders’ equity 
 
 
  
 
  98,000 
  27,000 
750,000 
 
 
  
62 
  
Exhibit 4 shows the calculation of the gross and net leverage ratios and changes in cash and 
security inventory balances after undertaking Repo transactions.  There is no impact on the total 
assets or total liabilities thus the gross and net leverage ratios remain the same. 
Exhibit 4 : Leverage Ratios After Undertaking Repo Transactions but Before  Payment 
 
Assets 
 
Liabilities 
Cash  107,500 Short Term financing 200,000 
Financial Instruments  200,000 Collateralized Financings 275,000 
Collateralized  Agreements 350,000 Long term Debt 150,000 
Account Receivables 
Other  Current liabilities 
Total 
Gross Leverage  
Net Leverage 
  20,000 
  72,500 
 750,000 
     28 
    15 
 Account Payable 
Stockholders’ equity 
 
 
 
98,000 
27,000 
750,000 
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Exhibit 5 shows calculations of gross and net leverage ratios after repayments of collateralized 
financing worth $100 using cash received from repo 105 transactions. This reduces security 
inventory and collateralized financing balances hence enabling Lehman Brothers to reduce its 
balance sheet size and report lower leverage ratios. 
 
  
Exhibit 5 : Leverage Ratios after  Short –Term Liabilities Payments 
 
Assets 
 
Liabilities 
Cash      7,500 Short Term financing 200,000 
Financial Instruments 
Collateralized 
200, 000 Collateralized Financings 175,000 
Agreements 350,000 Long term Debt 150,000 
Account Receivables 
Other  Current liabilities 
Total 
Gross Leverage  
Net Leverage 
  20,000 
  72,500 
650,000 
    24 
   11 
 Account Payable 
Stockholders’ equity 
 
 
 
   98,000 
   27,000 
650,000 
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Exhibit 6: Lehman Brothers stock performance, 1st November 2007- 15th September 2008 
Source: finance.yahoo.com  
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Exhibit 7 represent Lehman Brother‘s Business Connections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Global footprint 
 Market leadership 
- Credit derivatives 
- Mortgage backed 
securities 
- Equity and debt 
underwriting and 
trading 
- Fixed income and 
CDS pricing 
Corporate 
Issuers 
 
Insurance 
Companies 
 
Mortgage 
banks 
 
Other 
banks/dealers 
 
 
 
Lehman Brothers 
Over 7,000 legal 
entities in more than 40 
countries 
 
Money  Market 
Funds 
 
Hedge  
funds 
 
 Credit and interest 
rate derivatives 
 Primary dealer 
 Whole 
residential 
 Mortgage 
loans 
 Debt and equity securities 
 Commercial paper 
 OTC derivatives 
 MBS/CMBS 
 Prime  Brokerage 
 Custody 
 Trade finance 
 OTC derivatives 
 Secondary trading 
 MBS/CMBS 
 Market making 
 Firm finance 
 OTC derivatives 
 
 Debt 
 Equity 
 OTC 
derivatives 
 Commercial paper 
 
Sovereign and 
Municipal 
Debt issuers 
 
Source: PricewaterCoopers 
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Exhibit 8 Computation of Free cashflow and Change in Working Capital  
Tax Interest Rate 34,44% 36,38% 35,65% 36,08% 33,50% 
     
35,21% 
INCOME STATEMENT 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Revenues 17,287 21,250 32,420 46,709 59,003 
Operating Expenses 8,640 9,674 17,790 29,126 39,746 
Gross profit 8,647 11,576 14,630 17,583 19,257 
Other operating expenses 6,111 8,058 9,801 11,678 13,244 
Depreciation 0,315 0,426 0,428 0,514 0,577 
Operating income 2,221 3,092 4,401 5,391 5,436 
Interest paid 0 0 0 0 0 
Interest received 0 0 0 0 0 
Other non-operating income 0 0 0 0 0 
Pretax income 2,221 3,092 4,401 5,391 5,436 
Tax 0,765 1,125 1,569 1,945 1,821 
Net income 1,456 1,967 2,832 3,446 3,615 
Extraordinay items 0 
   
0 
Net income after extra items 1,456 1,967 2,832 3,446 3,615 
Dividends  0,178 0,258 0,302 0,342 0,418 
Retained earnings 1,278 1,709 2,530 3,104 3,197 
                  
BALANCE SHEET           
Cash and equivalents (policy) 0 0 0 0 0 
Cash and equivalents (NWC) 7,922 5,440 4,900 5,987 7,286 
Short term investments 292,636 339,772 393,162 483,762 667,733 
Other current assets 1,626 2,122 1,302 2,052 2,650 
Net fixed assets 2,806 2,988 2,885 3,269 3,861 
Long term investments 3,510 3,562 4,558 3,362 4,127 
Other long term assets 3,561 3,284 3,256 5,113 5,406 
Total assets 312,061 357,168 410,063 503,545 691,063 
Short term liabilities 211,718 232,765 267,977 58,609 53,307 
Current portion of LTD & Short-
Debt 2,331 2,857 11,351 20,638 28,066 
Other current liabilities 39,999 50,140 44,975 302,517 434,687 
Long term debt 41,303 53,561 53,899 81,178 123,150 
Other long term liabilities 2,226 2,925 15,067 21,412 29,363 
Total Liabilities 297,577 342,248 393,269 484,354 668,573 
Preferred stock 1,045 1,345 1,095 1,095 1,095 
Common stock 5,000 4,335 3,501 2,239 1,697 
Retained earnings 7,129 9,240 12,198 15,857 19,698 
Total liabilities and equity 310,751 357,168 410,063 503,545 691,063 
      Operating cash flow 
 
2,393 3,260 3,960 4,192 
Change in NWC 
 
13,436 13,489 34,976 51,572 
Change in fixed assets at cost 
 
0,608 0,325 0,898 1,169 
Free Cash Flow   -11,651 -10,554 -31,914 -48,549 
 
